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Summary
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is regarded as one of the most water-challenged regions in the world. The destabilizing impact of its 
resource constraints is compounded by the fact that some 60 percent of the 
region’s water flows across international borders, generating and exacerbating 
political tensions between states. Water insecurity will increase in the MENA 
region if the current situation of minimal water cooperation persists under the 
disabling conditions of political volatility, economic disintegration, institutional 
failure, and environmental degradation. Experiences from around the world 
demonstrate that countries that have achieved regional water cooperation have 
prospered together and kept the threat of conflict a remote possibility. It is time 
for the countries in the Middle East to realize that there is no alternative to 
sustainable water cooperation. 
Key Findings
  Water management is an important instrument for the prevention of conflict
  If MENA countries continue to pursue uncoordinated water-based 
development policies, the region may face severe food shortages by 2030-
2040
  Historical examples show that there is a close relationship between peace 
and water cooperation and vice versa
  MENA has yet to witness a full-scale war over water, but it has proven to be 
a multiplier of factors causing conflict
  Lesson to be learned from Syria’s civil war, where the severe drought for 
2006-2010 had a catalytic effect
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Introduction
The vital importance of water for human security and sustainable development has received worldwide attention. Much emphasis has been placed on the 
global status of water, namely water scarcity and a lack of access to clean water 
and sanitation. Certain regions are far weaker than others in terms of shared 
surface and groundwater resources between two or more countries. The Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) is regarded as one of the most challenged regions 
in this regard. In addition 
to the constraints of its 
natural water resources, 
MENA suffers from an 
abundance of issues that 
compound water security, 
including a rapidly 
growing population, disparate economic development, limited amounts of 
irregularly distributed water supply, negative impacts of climate change and 
variability, and poor water management and allocation practices both within 
and between states.
The geopolitical importance of the region, and the conflicts that have 
consequently resulted, aggravate the usual problems of sharing water in a variety 
of MENA settings, such as in the transboundary river basins of the Jordan, the 
Euphrates-Tigris, and the Nile. 
While MENA covers 4.9 percent of the total area of the world and contains 4.4 
percent of its population, its water resources, which total 484 km3, are only about 
1.1 percent of the total renewable water resources of the world. Moreover, large 
differences exist between MENA’s countries and its sub-regions. Globally, the 
average per capita water availability is close to 7,000 m3/person/year, whereas in 
MENA, only 1,200 m3/person/year is available. Half of the region’s population 
lives under conditions of water stress.1
Moreover, with the population expected to grow from 300 million today to 
500 million in 2025, per capita water availability is expected to halve by 2050, 
with serious consequences for the region’s already-stressed groundwater and 
natural hydrological system.2 Some 60 percent of the region’s water flows across 
“Half of the MENA region’s 
population lives under 
conditions of water stress.”
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international borders, complicating the resource management challenge. Every 
major river in the region crosses one or more international border, and 50 percent 
of MENA’s population depends on water flowing from another sovereign state. 
Political considerations of individual states exert pressure on water policies 
and often lead to policies that have unforeseen and serious consequences on 
populations and states downstream. 
In addition to being one of the most arid regions in the world, MENA 
experiences high natural variability in precipitation. With global warming and 
climate change, variability and aridity are both likely to increase. Researchers 
have identified 
an increasing 
tendency in annual 
and seasonal 
drought intensity 
c o r r e s p o n d i n g 
with an increasing 
number of dry days in the rainy season.3 There is evidence that climate change is 
already beginning to influence droughts in the area by reducing winter rainfall 
and increasing evapotranspiration at rates higher than can be explained by 
natural variability alone. Recent climate simulations all indicate growing water-
related risks from higher temperatures, increased evaporative water demands, 
reductions in future runoff levels, and changes in the timing of runoff.4 
Existing Key Water Disputes
All the major transboundary river basins in MENA are in sub-regions that 
have experienced severe political tensions. These political circumstances have 
aggravated past water disputes, which otherwise might have been solved had 
the political climate been more favorable. In other words, water disputes were 
overlaid, or at least influenced, by multifaceted interstate conflicts involving 
disputes over security, borders, and other issues.5 
“50 percent of MENA’s population 




The Jordan River system includes Israel, Jordan, Palestinian Authority, Syria 
and Lebanon. Total water availability in the Jordan basin is very limited. The 
riparians of the Jordan system place it among the countries with the lowest per 
capita water availability in the world. To complicate this harsh hydrological 
setting, the region has been the locus of a protracted political struggle.6 Since 
1967, “resource capture” has been a cause for water disputes in the Jordan basin. 
Its occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights gave Israel 
almost total control over the headwaters of the Jordan River and its tributaries, 
as well as control over the major recharge region for its groundwater aquifers. 
Hence, much of the tension over water between the Palestinians and the Israelis 
relates to discrimination in water allocation, pricing, and delivery systems.7 
Water consumption by Israeli settlers in the West Bank is roughly eight to ten 
times that of the Palestinians.8 With rapid population growth (3 percent per 
year), declining water availability in the West Bank is a tightening constraint on 
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agriculture and human use.9 To illustrate, water became a bone of contention 
between Israel and Lebanon in 2002. The Lebanese initiative to divert water from 
the Wazzani River— the main source of the Hasbani River, which contributes 
approximately 25 percent of the Jordan River’s water—deepened the rift between 
Israel and Lebanon. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon had described the 
project as a casus belli, arguing that Israel could not allow the project to proceed. 
A hot conflict between two states was averted through U.S. mediation.10 Hence, 
the water dispute in the Jordan basin is a distribution conflict embedded in a 
protracted political (Arab-Israeli) conflict, displaying all the characteristics of a 
zero-sum game.
Nile River Basin
In the late 1920s, under the full control of Britain, colonial water-sharing 
agreements were concluded throughout the Nile basin. Following the wave 
of independence in Africa in the 1950s, all upstream riparian states declared 
those agreements void, including the most important one, the 1929 Nile Water 
Agreement. This was later replaced by the still legally binding 1959 Agreement 
for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters, under which the two riparians 
agreed to share the water with 75 percent and 25 percent for Egypt and Sudan, 
respectively.11 The 1959 agreement has never been accepted by any of the upstream 
riparians, remaining a cause for recurring tensions. Egypt, so heavily dependent 
on the Nile waters, has used its 
military might and hegemonic 
status to threaten any upper 
riparian, primarily Ethiopia, 
from undertaking any projects 
that would risk Egypt’s share 
of the Nile.12 Challenging this historical status quo, in March 2011, the Ethiopian 
government announced plans to construct a hydroelectric dam on the Blue 
Nile, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which is expected to generate 
approximately 6,000MW of electricity, becoming Africa’s largest power plant. 
Concerns have been raised over the dam’s impact on Egypt. Tensions over the 
dam increased in May 2011 when Ethiopia temporarily diverted the flow of the 
Blue Nile as part of the construction process. After exchanges of harsh rhetoric 
“Water became a bone of 
contention between Israel and 
Lebanon in 2002.”
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between the heads of states, the foreign ministers of Egypt and Ethiopia met and 
agreed to hold further talks on the construction of the dam in June 2011.13 The 
current water dispute in the Nile basin intimately relates to the unfair clauses 
in the historical bilateral sharing agreements. The increasing ability and desire 
of the upstream states, namely Ethiopia, to challenge Egypt’s status as hydro-
hegemon and the overall status quo underpins the current tensions over water. 
Euphrates-Tigris Basin
The water question emerged on the regional agenda in the Euphrates-
Tigris basin when the three riparians initiated major water and land resource 
development projects. Only since the 1960s have Turkey and Syria put forward 
ambitious plans to develop the waters of the Euphrates-Tigris river system 
for energy and irrigation purposes. At the same time, Iraq also announced 
new schemes for an extension of its irrigated area.14 As the national water 
development ventures progressed, mismatches between water supply and 
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demand occurred throughout the river basin. The ad hoc technical negotiations 
were unable to prepare the ground for a comprehensive treaty on equitable and 
effective transboundary water management. Hence, a series of diplomatic crises 
occurred in the region in the last quarter of the 20th century. Turkey started 
impounding the Keban Reservoir by February 1974 at the same time that Syria 
had almost finalized the construction of the Tabaqa Dam. This was a period of 
severe drought. The impounding of both reservoirs escalated into a crisis in the 
spring of 1975. Iraq accused Syria of reducing the river’s flow to intolerable levels, 
while Syria placed the blame on Turkey. The Iraqi government was not satisfied 
with the Syrian response, and the mounting frustration resulted in mutual threats 
bringing the parties to the brink of armed hostility. A war over water was averted 
with Saudi mediation, resulting in extra amounts of water being released from 
Syria to Iraq.15 In January 1990, Turkey temporarily intervened in the flow of the 
Euphrates River in order to fill the Atatürk dam reservoir. Even though Turkey had 
notified its downstream neighbors by November 1989 of the impending event 
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and had sent delegations to Middle Eastern countries to explain the need for the 
impoundment and the measures taken, the Syrian and the Iraqi governments 
officially protested Turkey, and consequently called for an agreement to share 
the waters of the Euphrates, as well as a reduction in the impounding period.16 
In 1998, Turkish-Syrian relations became tense when Turkey threatened Syria 
with military measures to prevent Syria from providing ample support to the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party. War was prevented by the mediation of Egyptian and 
Iranian leaders. This event paved the way for the conclusion of the Turkish-
Syrian Ceyhan 
Security Agreement 




resumption of the 
Joint Technical 
C o m m i t t e e 
meetings to enable the water issue to be considered. Hence, the water dispute 
in the basin originated due to the competitive, uncoordinated, and unilateral 
water development projects of the riparians; however, the political linkages 
established between transboundary water issues and non-riparian security 
issues also exacerbated the disagreements over water-sharing and allocation. 
Where Are We Today in Terms of 
Regional Water Cooperation?
There is no regional institution that is capable of bringing together all the 
major countries in the region to negotiate and manage economic and political 
issues. The main intergovernmental regional organization, the Arab League, 
does not include Ethiopia, Turkey, Iran, and Israel, and the organization itself is 
beset with internal divisions. Under this non-cooperative regional framework, 
historically, transboundary rivers in the Middle East have been a source of 
tension between countries. In this context, although the claim that water was 
a major cause of the 1967 war is much disputed, there is little doubt that the 
“There is no regional institution 
that is capable of bringing together 
all the major countries in the region 
to negotiate and manage economic 
and political issues.”
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development of Israel’s National Water Carrier in 1964 and subsequent Syrian 
attempts to divert the headwaters of the Jordan River played a part in the chain 
of events leading to the war.18 
With regard to regional water cooperation, there are only rudimentary 
forms of cooperation and agreements in place. Comprehensive transboundary 
agreements or treaties that could help regulate potentially inharmonious claims 
by riparian states are not found. There are a limited number of bilateral, and 
sometimes outdated, protocols and other arrangements. Hence, the existence of 
a treaty on a water basin in the MENA region could not be accepted as evidence 
of cooperation. To illustrate, the volatile relations between the Arabs and Israelis 
occasionally witnessed attempts at transboundary water cooperation, albeit 
fruitless.19 Nonetheless, in the aftermath of the Gulf crisis in 1990, coupled with 
the end of the Cold War, the rules of engagement in the region drastically changed. 
With the political 
scene changed, 
U.S. President 
George H.W. Bush 
was in a position 
to convene the 
Madrid Peace Talks 
in October 1991.20 
In the treaties and agreements signed since then, water has been given utmost 
attention.21 In addition to the bilateral nature (Israel-Jordan; Israel-Palestinian 
Authority) of these agreements, Syria and Lebanon were excluded since they 
boycotted the Middle East Peace Process altogether. In the peace treaty between 
Israel and Jordan, Article 6 and Annex II are devoted to water problems. Even 
though the water stipulations of the treaty are rather balanced in terms of the 
emphasis on equitable and efficient use of available water resources, the rights of 
the Palestinians in the West Bank are totally ignored.22 The treaty did not detail 
what would happen to the prescribed allocations in a drought. In early 1999, the 
worst drought on record led to tensions as water deliveries to Jordan fell.23 On 
the other front, the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization incorporate, in the very detailed Article 40, “the Palestinian 
water rights in the West Bank,” but water rights of the Palestinians from the 
“With regard to regional water 
cooperation, there are only 
rudimentary forms of cooperation 
and agreements in place.”
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surface water of the Jordan River are not discussed at all.24 All in all, these 
agreements are bilateral and exclude the water rights of pivotal riparians, and 
they predominantly concern water quantity or border issues while neglecting 
vital and urgent issues such as drought management.25 
In 1987 and 1990 two bilateral protocols—acknowledged by all the riparian 
states as interim agreements—were signed, following a number of high-level 
meetings of top officials in the Euphrates-Tigris basin. In 1987, the Turkish-
Syrian Protocol on Economic Cooperation was the first formal bilateral 
agreement reached on the Euphrates. Turkey promised a water flow of up to 
500 m3 per second, or about 16 km3 per year, at the Turkish-Syrian border, with 
the intention of reaching an agreement with Syria on security matters.26 On the 
other hand, the Syrian-Iraqi water protocol of 1990 designated Syria’s share of 
the Euphrates waters at 42 percent and the remaining 58 percent was allocated 
to Iraq as a fixed annual total 
percentage.27 However, these 
bilateral accords have failed 
to include basic components 
of integrated water resources 
management, namely the 
exchange of water and land 
resources data, water quality 
management, environmental protection, and stakeholder engagement. Indeed, 
data and information regarding stream flow, water removal, return flow, present 
water use, land use, and so forth have been generally incomplete and not 
regularly exchanged between riparian states. This constitutes a major limitation 
to proper assessment and management of water and land resources in the 
basin. Furthermore, both treaties failed to address fluctuations in flow, meaning 
that they contained no clauses referring to the periods of drought that occur 
frequently in the basin and cause drastic changes in the flow regime that require 
urgent adjustment to the use of the rivers.28 The water-sharing protocols also 
lack an effective organizational backup, at least in the form of joint monitoring 
of these agreements. 
“These bilateral accords 
have failed to include basic 
components of integrated 
water resources management.”
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River basin organizations or technical water committees that might serve 
as platforms for the accommodation of water conflicts largely do not exist 
in the MENA region, and, if they do, they are unable to fulfill their mandate. 
In the early 1980s, the Euphrates-Tigris basin riparians managed to build an 
institutional framework, namely the Joint Technical Committee (J.T.C.), whose 
members included participants from all three riparians.29 Yet, they couldn’t 
succeed to empower the committee with a clear and jointly agreed mandate. 
Instead, the riparian countries continued unilateral and uncoordinated water 
and land development ventures. The J.T.C. meetings did not make an effective 
contribution to the settlement of the transboundary water dispute, and it did 
not provide a platform for delineating the co-riparians’ priorities and needs as a 
basis for addressing regional water problems. In this respect, water use patterns 




had a chance of 
being discussed at 
the J.T.C. meetings. 
National management and allocation policies were like “black boxes,” and water 
management practices within the various countries simply could not be debated 
during those negotiations.30 
On the other hand, there have been considerable cooperative efforts in the Nile 
River Basin, culminating in the founding of the Nile Basin Initiative (N.B.I.) 
in 1999.31 Under the auspices of the N.B.I., there have been many cooperative 
projects and negotiations to devise a Cooperative Framework Agreement 
(2010), which has so far been signed by six countries and ratified by three.32 
So, despite the fact that there remain bilateral disputes over water-sharing (e.g., 
between Egypt and Ethiopia), there have been credible efforts to reach a joint 
management scheme for the entire river basin. Even regarding the status of the 
most controversial project, namely the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, the 
three concerned riparians (Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan) started consultations 
in 2011, which culminated in the establishment of the International Panel of 
Experts (I.P.O.E.) in May 2012. Based on the recommendations of the I.P.O.E., 
“ There have been credible efforts to 
reach a joint management scheme 
for the entire Nile River Basin.”
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the three countries agreed to carry out selected specialized studies to quantify 
impacts and support the formulation of dam filling and operation guidelines.33 
Subsequently, the three countries signed the Declaration of Principles (D.o.P.) on 
March 23, 2015, the core of which involves the agreement by the three countries 
to formulate and agree on the first dam filling and operation guidelines and 
rules.34 Years of deliberations in N.B.I. fora have helped the parties, first, to 
understand each other’s concerns, and, second, to know each other better and 
thereby more effectively manage the rigor of such negotiations. However, despite 
the progress achieved by these cooperative institutions, these initiatives could 
not operationalize the globally agreed principles of customary international 
law, namely “the equitable reasonable utilization,” “the obligation not to cause 
significant harm,” and “the principle of protection and conservation of the river’s 
ecosystem.” All these 
principles have been 
referred to as the 
main constituents 
of cooperative 
f r a m e w o r k 
agreements and 
institutions, yet the 
riparians have not been successful in putting them into practice and replacing 
the 1959 agreement. 
Notwithstanding the failures in interstate water cooperation, as well as the 
shortcomings and loopholes in existing water agreements, the present overarching 
challenge in the MENA region is to coordinate water resource management and 
to establish transboundary water cooperation in the midst of the current state of 
affairs. That is to say, the turmoil in Syria and instability in Iraq, which have had 
deep impacts and spill-over effects on their neighbors, demonstrate that, while 
the genesis of these conflicts have complicated narratives, water is a key part of 
them. The depletion of lakes and rivers, the lack of clean water to drink, and the 
loss of livelihood for farmers and fishermen dependent on these water resources 
are integral parts of these conflicts. With the rising violence and instability in 
the region, and with no regional coordination and poor security schemes along 
the rivers themselves, violent non-state actors, namely ISIS, have been able 
“With no regional coordination, 
violent non-state actors have been 
able to use water as both a resource 
and a weapon.”
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to use water as both a resource and a weapon. Not only have they destroyed 
water-related infrastructure, such as pipes, sanitation plants, bridges, and cables 
connected to water installations, but they have also used water as an instrument 
of violence by deliberately flooding towns, polluting bodies of water, and ruining 
local economies by disrupting electricity generation and agriculture. To illustrate, 
in 2014, when the group shut down Fallujah’s Nuaimiyah Dam, the subsequent 
flooding destroyed 77 square miles of Iraqi fields and villages.35 In June 2015, 
they closed the Ramadi Barrage in Anbar Province, reducing water flows to the 
famed Iraqi marshes and forcing the Arabs living there to flee. The Mosul Dam 
gave ISIS control of nearly 20 percent of Iraq’s electricity generation while it was 
in the group’s possession for a few weeks in August 2014.36 Furthermore, since 
the civil war erupted in Syria, ISIS has seized the opportunity to control territory 
in the conflicted 
region by joining 
the fight against 
the Assad regime.37 
By the end of 2012, 
ISIS controlled all of 
the country’s major 
dams, including the Tabaqa Dam, a centerpiece of water management in Syria.38 
ISIS lost the Tishrin Dam, located downstream from Tabaqa, in December 2015 
after an alliance of rebel forces carried out major operations in the area.39 Yet, 
ISIS still controls swathes of territory on the western bank of the Euphrates 
River from Raqqa to Jarablus on the border with Turkey.40 At the same time, 
governments and militaries have used similar tactics to combat ISIS, closing 
the gates of dams or attacking water infrastructure under their control. But ISIS 
fighters are not the only ones hurt by these efforts—the surrounding population 
suffers too. The Syrian government has been repeatedly accused of withholding 
water, reducing flows, or closing dam gates during its battles against ISIS 
or rebel groups, and it has used the denial of clean water as a coercive tactic 
against many suburbs of Damascus thought to be sympathetic to the rebels. 
Water contamination then becomes widespread, with disastrous results and an 
increase in deadly water-borne diseases.41 
“The Mosul Dam gave ISIS control 
of nearly 20 percent of Iraq’s 
electricity generation.”
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Where will the Region be in 2030 
without Cooperation?
Water is not just about providing a resource to people, it is also about security on 
the individual, national, and international levels. Water insecurity will increase in 
the MENA region if the current situation of minimal water cooperation persists 
under the disabling conditions of political volatility, economic disintegration, 
institutional failure, and environmental degradation. A lack of cooperation will 
precipitate economic decline and worsen the negative impacts of climate change 
on water resources and socio-economic development.
Despite the recent history of political turbulence, MENA has yet to witness a 
full-scale war over water, but the danger of such a confrontation is only mounting. 
So far, Middle Eastern leaders 
have acted carefully when it 
has come to taking the risk of 
waging a war over water, despite 
strong rhetoric to the contrary. 
However, this historical pattern 
might not hold if leaders 
fail to establish sustainable 
cooperation over water. That is to say, water has recently become a weapon in 
sub-state level conflicts in the pivotal transboundary river basins of the region, 
namely the Euphrates-Tigris river basin. The ongoing spread of ISIS across the 
basin has led to “violent non-state actors” seizing control of water resources in 
Syria and Iraq.42 Continuation of the current situation means prolonged water 
shortages, causing severe problems for urban and rural people and generating 
serious agricultural and economic decline. Syria’s water crisis has already 
deepened alongside the civil war; water availability is about half what it was 
before the crisis began in 2011.43 In conflict-affected areas, the availability of 
water per person has decreased to one-third of pre-crisis levels, from 75 to 25 
liters per person per day. Treatment of sewage has decreased nationally from 
70 percent before the crisis to 35 percent today.44 Ongoing violence and heavy 
clashes have caused severe damage to pipelines and other water infrastructure.45 
The International Committee of the Red Cross reporting from Aleppo revealed 
“A lack of cooperation will 
precipitate economic decline 
and worsen the negative 
impacts of climate change.”
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that water routinely gets cut in both government and rebel-held areas and that 
different sides continue to exchange blame over who is responsible for the lack 
of water. A similar situation exists in Damascus, where cutting the water supply 
has been used as a tactic by warring parties to exert pressure on the other.46 
Water shortages have also been a factor leading to displacement within and 
migration from the country. Since the eruption of civil war, 4.8 million Syrians 
have been forced to leave the country, and 6.5 million are internally displaced, 
making Syria the largest displacement crisis globally.47 
Economic integration and coherence among MENA states remains weak.48 
This phenomenon has direct reflection in domestic and transboundary water 
resources management. To illustrate, the riparian states of the Euphrates-Tigris 
river basin have adopted competitive economic development policies for food 
and energy security. Water and land resource development projects (i.e., the 
Southeastern Anatolia Project and the Euphrates Valley Project of Turkey and 
Syria, respectively) were 
carried out unilaterally and 
mainly with a development 
focus with insufficient care 
for ecosystem protection. If 
these actors continue these 
unilateral, uncoordinated, and competitive water-based economic development 
projects, their actions will aggravate tensions in the region and lead to prolonged, 
unsustainable use and management of resources and a loss of ecosystems.49 
Accessible water resources are unevenly distributed across the globe, with 
per capita resources particularly low in MENA. Within the region there are 
significant variations in water availability. Inequality within and between 
countries, communities, and households means that many people continue 
to have inadequate access to water. If MENA countries continue to pursue 
uncoordinated water-based development policies, the depletion of water 
resources will continue in the region, and by 2030-2040, the region may face 
severe food shortages.50 
On the other hand, the studies on climate change show that the surface 
temperature of the Middle East will increase by 2.5 to 5.5°C in the years to come, 
causing a 20 percent decrease in precipitation in the region.51 Water security 
“The surface temperature of the 
Middle East will increase by 2.5 
to 5.5°C in the years to come.”
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in terms of accessing enough clean water and sanitation, as well as benefitting 
from water for economic, social, and cultural development, is in jeopardy due 
to human-induced climatic changes in MENA. There will be less water available 
for irrigation, energy production, and domestic and industrial use. Less water in 
the rivers will also increase the stress on the ecosystems along the rivers. Such 
events, which could be more frequent and intense in the future, could threaten 
water availability and food security and may cause further conflicts in the region. 
The severe drought in the Euphrates-Tigris basin conveys important messages 
about what might happen in the MENA region in the future. Policy analysts have 
previously suggested that the drought played a role in the Syrian unrest, and 
scientific researchers addressed this as well, saying the drought had a catalytic 
effect.52 The uprising in Syria was, in fact, triggered by a series of contextual factors, 
including, growing poverty caused by rapid economic liberalization and the 
cancellation of state subsidies after 2005, a growing rural-urban divide, widespread 
corruption, rising 
unemployment, the 
effects of a severe 
drought between 
2006 and 2010, and 
a lack of political 
freedom. All these elements are connected and have mutually influenced each 
other, making it difficult to untangle the importance of different “triggers” or 
to identify any single one as the definitive cause.53 With all its complex reasons, 
the civil war in Syria has caused one of the largest refugee crises in recent world 
history. There is no doubt that increased efforts are needed to address not only 
the pressing humanitarian situation, but also the root causes of the refugee crisis. 
An important number of these causes are found in the nexus between climate 
change, water scarcity, poor governance, and conflict. Water scarcity, or stress, 
is not the only driver of migration, but there is, without question, an indirect 
correlation between climate change, drought, and migration. If unattended by 
the concerned regional authorities, climate change will aggravate existing social 
tensions and political instability and will likely add additional pressures on the 
states and regions that are already fragile and conflict-prone, as in the Syria case.
“There is, without question, an 
indirect correlation between climate 
change, drought, and migration.”
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The Benefits of Regional Cooperation
There is an obvious and urgent need for regional water cooperation in the 
MENA region. In designing such a regional water cooperation framework in 
the Middle East, it is useful and inspiring to draw lessons from historical and 
contemporary models that exist in the world, which demonstrate that water and 
its sustainable management can be an excellent source of cooperation. Many 
countries around the world have proved that building strong institutions that 
effectively govern transboundary water resources in a collaborative manner is 
an effective tool to manage any natural calamity as well as to prevent conflicts 
based on other factors.54  
Water issues usually formed an important part of historical peace agreements 
in Europe. To recall, the Congress of Vienna (1815) established the regime 
for the Rhine River and the Central Commission for the Navigation of the 
Rhine.55 Likewise, the 1856 
Paris Agreement established the 
European Commission on the 
Danube. Both commissions exist 
today in their modernized forms 
and are among the elements 
of European stability.56 These historical examples show that there is a close 
relationship between peace and water cooperation and vice versa. 
Contemporary models of regional water cooperation demonstrate that the 
relationship between water and peace is not only a matter of post-conflict 
arrangements. Water management is an important instrument for the prevention 
of conflict. The establishment in 2010 of the Commission on the Administration 
of the River Uruguay, following the peaceful resolution of a bitter dispute 
between Argentina and Uruguay, is an example of the political necessity of 
administrating environmental matters in an effective, preventive manner.57 
Moreover, there exist other initiatives that lay down the foundations for long-
term regional cooperation and stability. The Senegal River Basin Organization 
is probably the most far-reaching arrangement today. The organization controls 
the water assets in Mali, Senegal, Mauritania, and Guinea and manages them as 
a “regional common,” transcending national interests.58 
“Water management is an 
important instrument for the 
prevention of conflict.”
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Water cooperation between countries sharing transboundary water resources 
is directly correlated with the security of nations involved in such cooperation 
and with peace in the continent or subcontinent to which they belong. The 
examples of the European Union, which used steel and coal to begin its process 
of cooperation, and the Southern African Development Community (S.A.D.C.), 
which used broad economic development as its starting point, clearly indicate 
that a regional approach is essential. Africans have learned from the European 
example and expanded on the S.A.D.C. to incorporate a number of other vital 
aspects, including a common water region for all member countries, even though 
some of them, such as Madagascar and Malawi, do not share common water 
resources.59 These countries have found value in a shared policy framework 
and use that framework as the basis for negotiating basin-specific agreements. 
The wisdom demonstrated by countries in Europe and southern Africa can be 
relevant for those in the Middle East and elsewhere. 
Examples of active water 
cooperation mechanisms 
indicate that it is not 
the size and nature of a 
country or its economy, 
or its recent history or 
political markup, but 
its political will and 
commitment at the highest level that are the keys to success. There is also no 
all-encompassing set of formulae for such institutions and mechanisms. Over 
time, countries and regions have devised their own success stories. Yet, if we 
look closely, we realize that countries that engage in active water cooperation, 
which also includes cooperation concerning energy, environment, and other 
development factors, tend to move beyond their differences on other issues. 
In this respect, one productive approach to the cooperative development of 
transboundary waters in the Middle East should be to take a regional view of 
the benefits to be derived from the river basins. When negotiations focus solely 
on water-sharing, upstream and downstream differences will be exacerbated, 
thereby giving greater prominence to water gains and losses. Taking a broader 
view of regional benefits has regularly required the riparian states to see water 
as more than just a commodity to be divided—a zero-sum, rights-based 
view—and to develop a positive-sum, integrative approach that ensures the 
“Countries that engage in active 
water cooperation, tend to move 
beyond their differences on 
other issues.”
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equitable allocation not of the water, but of the benefits derived from it. Adding 
development opportunities in other sectors may enlarge the area of possible 
agreement and make implementation more manageable. Inter-sectorial linkages 
may offer more opportunities for the generation of creative solutions, allowing 
for greater economic efficiency through a “basket of benefits.”60 
There is a possible scope for increasing water cooperation from quantity or 
quality issues to a broader set of issues and for moving from “sharing water” 
(i.e. allocating water resources among riparian states) to “sharing the benefits of 
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There is even greater 
scope for increasing 
cooperation by moving from “sharing the benefits of water” to “realizing the 
broader benefits of water cooperation,” such as greater economic integration 
in the region. Those benefits can be realized by accelerating economic growth, 
increasing human wellbeing, enhancing environmental sustainability, and 
contributing to political stability and peace. 
One of the factors often hindering better regional water cooperation is the 
lack of recognition of the benefits of cooperation. Countries generally cooperate 
when the net benefits of cooperation are perceived to be greater than the net 
benefits of non-cooperation, as well as when the distribution of these net benefits 
is perceived to be fair. The decision-makers in the ministries responsible for the 
environment, water resources, economics, and foreign affairs should realize the 
potential of regional water cooperation by providing an overview of the full set 
of benefits that can be exploited, an introduction to how the specific benefits 
can be assessed, as well as a guide on how the assessment of such benefits can be 
integrated into policymaking processes. A holistic approach to transboundary 
water cooperation should be adopted by looking at the environmental, social, 
and economic implications of water use. 
“One of the factors often hindering 
better regional water cooperation 
is the lack of recognition of the 
benefits of cooperation.”
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Regional water cooperation, through improved water management, generates a 
range of economic, social, and environmental benefits. Although comprehensive 
identification, assessment, and implementation remains a challenge, most 
of those benefits are well-known in the water policy community, such as 
developing hydropower, producing food by irrigated agriculture, supplying 
water to urban and rural communities, as well as flood control and drought 
management. Below, Table 1 demonstrates the diversity of economic, social, and 
environmental benefits that can be derived from improved water management 
under a regional water cooperation framework. Moreover, it also displays how 
regional water cooperation could foster regional economic integration and 
generate peace and security benefits from enhanced trust. 




  Expanded activity and productivity 
in economic sectors (irrigated 
agriculture, energy generation, 
industrial production)
  Reduced cost of carrying out 
productive activities
  Reduced economic impacts of 
water-related hazards (floods, 
droughts)
Social and Environmental Benefits
  Health impacts from improved 
water quality and reduced risk of 
water-related disasters.
  Employment and reduced poverty 
impacts 
  Improved access to services (such 
as electricity and water supply) 




Regional Economic Integration 
Benefits
  Development of regional markets 
for goods, services, and labor
  Increase in cross-border 
investments
  Development of transnational 
infrastructure networks
Peace and Security Benefits
  Ability to avoid costs of military 
conflicts
  Savings from reduced military 
spending
  Other geo-political benefits
Table 1. Potential benefits of regional water cooperation
Source: “Counting our gains: Sharing experiences on identifying, assessing and communicating the benefits of 
transboundary water cooperation,” Policy Guidance Note, 2014, accessed August 29, 2016, http://www.unece.org/env/
water/workshop_benefits_cooperation_2014.html#/
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Where Could the Region be in 2030 in a 
Scenario Involving Significant Regional 
Water Cooperation?
In order to design a modus operandi for a mechanism for regional water 
cooperation in the MENA region, one simply has to look back at the recent past. 
In 2010, in a historic series of meetings, proactive leaders of four countries in 
the Middle East, (Turkey, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon) came together and forged 
ties for the creation of a future economic regional community. They had a vision 
to create a European Union for the Middle East and call it “Shamgen,” named 
after Syria’s historical name “al-Sham,” which stretched from Mesopotamia 
to the Eastern Mediterranean. Their vision would cover trade and transport, 
oversee banking and business laws, eliminate visa constraints, allow for the 
free movement of goods, and provide a new future for the people in the region. 
The international community lauded their efforts and was eager to aid in these 
endeavors. There was talk that the community and union could further expand 
in the future to cover other aspects of governance and life, such as water resource 
management, and could continue to grow in the future. The leaders of the four 
countries intricately connected by common history, people, and resources also 
invited Iraq to join in their journey. This invitation was born out of a realization 
that Iraq was closely linked to three of the countries in the “Shamgen zone.” 
It was expected that Iraq would join once it solved its internal constitutional 
constraints.  
While, in view of the political volatility since 2011, such cooperation may 
appear to be a dream; the situation was different in the second half of 2010. 
The decision taken by the leaders in June 2010 to promote regional integration 
was promptly implemented through various policy measures, mechanisms, 
and arrangements within a 
few months. The countries’ 
leaders called for region-
wide cooperation on 
transport, banking, trade, 
and other sectors and could 
have laid the foundation 
for further agreements on 
“In order to design a modus 
operandi for a mechanism for 
regional water cooperation, one 
simply has to look back at the 
recent past.”
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the distribution of regional 
natural resources like water. 
Though ambitious, the ideas 
and sentiments behind the 
proposals had the power to transform that pivotal MENA sub-region. 
No matter how bleak the future might look, the “Shamgen” experiment of 2010 
clearly demonstrates that cooperation is possible. As soon as the next window of 
opportunity opens, the five countries, including Iraq, will have to demonstrate 
the same vision and foresight so as to create new means of cooperation. In fact, 
there is no alternative to cooperation. 
Another attempt for cooperation over water resources is still in the process in 
the Nile basin. Egypt and Ethiopia, who had been locked in a bitter war of words 
over Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam project, managed to sign a deal (D.o.P.) 
in 2015 that paved the way for a joint approach to regional water supplies. The 
agreement included giving priority to downstream countries for electricity 
generated by the dam, a mechanism for resolving conflicts, and the provision of 
compensation for damages. Signatories also pledged to protect the interests of 
downstream countries when the dam’s reservoir is filled. The deal is important 
because it appears to mark a move away from Egypt’s historical insistence on 
maintaining colonial-era agreements on water rights.62 The Ethiopians also 
argue that the dam will transform their country, where only around one-third 
of the population has access to electricity, into a major electricity exporter to 
East Africa—raising living standards, spurring economic growth, and moving 
beyond a history of drought and famine.63 Yet, still, the overarching management 
challenges in the Nile basin are poverty, water scarcity, and variability on the 
one hand, and weak relations between and political instability within many of 
the riparian states on the other. Since 1999, the N.B.I. has operated in the basin 
to manage basin activities, such as planning transboundary water projects that 
have the potential to transform food, water, and energy security. In order to 
reach a sustainable, efficient, and equitable water future in this vast sub-region of 
the MENA region, its members should clearly empower the N.B.I. to become a 
forum for joint planning, management, and development of the transboundary 
water resources 
In the Jordan River basin, where transboundary water relations have always 
been a bone of contention, a cooperative spirit has emerged recently through 
creative ideas on innovative joint water development and management. 
“The “Shamgen” experiment of 
2010 clearly demonstrates that 
cooperation is possible.”
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Israel, Jordan, and the 
Palestinian Authority have 
been moving ahead, in a 
cooperative mood, with a 
plan to build a water-carrying canal from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea, which 
will rehabilitate the shrinking Dead Sea and supply drinking water to Israelis, 
Jordanians and Palestinians.64 Yet, the project is not without problems. The 
Friends of the Earth Middle East (F.o.E.M.E.), a leading N.G.O. in the region, 
and other environmental groups have countered that the mega-project was 
fatally flawed from the outset. They argue that the only sustainable solution is 
to tackle the source of the problem by rehabilitating the Jordan River, which, 
since time immemorial, has fed the Dead Sea with fresh water. Such freshwater 
is now singularly lacking because of massive diversions in the form of dams, 
canals, and pumping stations constructed by Israel, Syria, Jordan, and the 
Palestinian Authority alike.65 On the other hand, F.o.E.M.E. commissioned an 
interesting scientific proposal, which evidently demonstrated that Israelis and 
Palestinians can reach an agreement over the use of water resources even before 
they solve other thorny issues and can, thus, create a precedent for cooperation 
on a contentious matter. According to this proposal, new bilateral committees 
(instead of the problematic Joint Water Committee created by the Oslo Accords) 
would determine water allocation not by fixed quotas, as is the case now, but 
rather according to guidelines designed to protect the ecosystem and to benefit 
all. It would make key decisions on rates of pumping and transport of water 
based on advice from a subsidiary scientific body, which would operate under 
the auspices of the Palestinian Authority and Israel. A mediation board would 
deal with any complaints by groups opposing the decisions made by the new 
bodies. The proposal’s main goal is to provide water to all parties and to secure 
efficient, equitable, and sustainable management of shared resources over the 
long term. The proposal serves interests on both sides, because it will ensure 
that the Palestinians receive more water and that the water used by Israel will be 
of good quality.66 
The MENA region, in fact, represents a diverse set of sub-regions, such as 
the Gulf. The natural features and climates of the Gulf states are similar, with 
each state having extremely arid climates with negligible precipitation. Natural 
water sources are scarce, and arable land is extremely limited. Human factors, 
such as high population growth, rapid urbanization, and gigantic industrial 
“Israelis and Palestinians can 
reach an agreement over the use 
of water resources even before 
they solve other thorny issues.”
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and agricultural projects exacerbate the pressure on already strained water-
supply systems. The Gulf states have had little choice but to secure alternative 
(un-conventional) water supplies. The most important of these alternatives 
are the desalination plants in the Gulf, which, as of 2014, accounted for some 
70 percent of the world’s desalinated water output. However, dependence on 
desalination has placed a severe strain on the national budgets of the Gulf states 
and has caused irreparable damage to local and regional ecosystems.67 What 
Gulf countries need is a broad strategy for addressing water security that does 
not simply rely on energy export revenues to finance short-term solutions to 
the problem. They should strive to create a more conscientious society through 
environmental and social awareness campaigns and education programs. 
Investment in water recycling for irrigation and municipal use presents a great 
opportunity for reducing the demand for desalinated water. Furthermore, 
research and development in renewable energy for desalinization may provide 
sustainable, long-term fixes. Other creative solutions include the construction 
of dams that would improve rain capture and groundwater recharge and the 
use of cloud seeding to enhance rainfall. While there may be no quick fix, a 
competent strategy to tackle water security from both the supply and demand 
side is necessary for ensuring that the economic development that has defined 
this region in the previous decades continues for years to come.68 
Water cooperation in the MENA region does not develop overnight or even 
in the space of a few months; it takes time and requires a great deal of trust. 
The necessary change, involving various cooperative initiatives, is closely and 
intimately related to the change in overall political relations, with decisions 
being made at the highest level. However, the recent initiatives and efforts for 
water cooperation, particularly in the pivotal transboundary river basins of 
the region, are important steps in the right direction and have the potential to 
create long-lasting relationships between nations that can expand into other 
areas. Experiences from around the world demonstrate that countries that have 
achieved regional water cooperation have prospered together and kept the 
threat of conflict a remote possibility. It is time for the countries in the Middle 
East to realize that there is 
no alternative to sustainable 
water cooperation and to take 
the necessary steps to sail 
together in that direction.  
“Water cooperation in the 
MENA region does not develop 
overnight.”
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